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FROM WARDS COVE TO RICCI: STRUGGLING




When Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act ("1991 Act"),
the new disparate impact provisions of the law were heralded as a
victory for civil rights plaintiffs.' After all, the statute was enacted
in response to the Supreme Court's cramped, "near-death"2
interpretation of disparate impact law in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. The new law was a legislative sanctioning of the judicially
created doctrine that facially neutral policies may still violate Title
VII if their impact falls too heavily on a protected class and they
cannot be justified as "business necessity."' This aspect of
antidiscrimination law was viewed by many as the best chance for
challenging the "built-in headwinds" that continue to keep equal
employment opportunity out of reach.'
Twenty years later, it is not at all clear that the disparate
impact provisions of the 1991 Act have delivered their promised
victory. Disparate impact claims are very rarely successful.6
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Many
thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Roberto Corrada, Scott Moss, Helen Norton,
and Catherine Smith for their always helpful comments.
1. See Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just
Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
201, 202 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/40
/LRColl2009n40Sullivan.pdf (noting the "firestorm of protest" that led to the
passage of the 1991 Act).
2. Id.
3. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
4. See Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New
Disparate Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2181, 2194 (2010) (outlining the disparate
impact analysis codified by the 1991 Act).
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
6. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REv. 251, 257 (2011); Michael Selmi, Was Disparate
Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 735-43 (2006); Elaine W.
Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs
Still Good For? What Not?, 49 BRANDEIs L.J. 597, 598 (2004).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,
while technically a disparate treatment case, may well have done as
much to eviscerate disparate impact's potential as Wards Cove did
twenty years earlier." The decisions share many common themes:
both have particularly unusual facts, both reveal the Court's
willingness to eschew procedural limitations to reach substantive
questions not properly before the Court, and both show sharp
divisions among the Justices. Perhaps most importantly, both
reveal deep skepticism on the part of many Justices about the
underlying premise of disparate impact law: that racial inequalities
persist because of continued systemic and institutional biases that
can and should be addressed.
But while Wards Cove spoke directly to standards of proof for
litigating disparate impact claims, Ricci's consequences will be felt
on the compliance side of the law. These consequences may be
especially dire because disparate impact was always most useful for
its deterrence and compliance effects. Even though plaintiffs have
only rarely succeeded in bringing disparate impact claims, the
powerful statement of equality inherent in such claims-embodied
in the principle that employers should not use facially neutral
practices that create a disparate impact unless there is a true
business necessity to do so-is an essential message of
antidiscrimination law. And the possibility of disparate impact
litigation prompts companies to evaluate their own practices and to
make internal adjustments that make employment policies more
fair.
This Article begins, in Part I, by considering the early potential
of disparate impact law, and the Supreme Court's response in Wards
Cove. Part II evaluates how much the Civil Rights Act of 1991
actually promised discrimination plaintiffs and examines how
disparate impact litigation developed in subsequent years. Part III
considers the Court's decision in Ricci and its consequences for the
voluntary compliance efforts that disparate impact law has
encouraged.
When the Supreme Court in 1971 first recognized disparate
impact as a legal theory under Title VII, the Court explained that
the "absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability."9 Forty years later, it is the built-in headwinds of a
Supreme Court skeptical of-perhaps even hostile to-the goals of
disparate impact theory that pose the greatest challenge to
continued movement toward workplace equality.
7. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
8. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51.
9. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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I. GIVING DISPARATE IMPACT LIFE AND TAKING IT AWAY
The disparate impact cause of action was first recognized by the
Supreme Court as a necessary element of Title VII in order for that
statute to truly reach all employment practices that operated to
deny equal opportunity. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme
Court explained that Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice that operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."o The Griggs Court understood that intentional
discrimination was not only hard to prove but was also only part of
the problem in workplaces that had for so long unthinkingly
imposed rules that disadvantaged women and people of color.n
During the 1970s and 1980s, disparate impact theory was used
to challenge the kinds of "objective" employment criteria-primarily
standardized test requirements-that had been disputed in Griggs. 12
Importantly though, it also encouraged employer compliance efforts
and even voluntary affirmative action programs." Lawyers and
human resource professionals advised companies to carefully
evaluate their job requirements and to "initiate and implement more
creative selection and training procedures."" And many civil rights
advocates viewed disparate impact theory as a driving force behind
Title VII's success as a "major instrument of social progress.""
But disparate impact faced vocal criticism from the beginning.16
Courts and commentators worried that
acceptance of the idea that discrepancies between racial
composition of the community and the plant or department
alone make out a prima facie case of discrimination leads
10. Id. at 431.
11. See id. at 429-30.
12. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 708; Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the
Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact
Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1977) (describing cases).
13. See Herbert N. Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications
for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEX. L. REV. 901, 928 (1972) ("The
importance of the Griggs decision, then, goes well beyond the Court's holding
that employment tests require validation. It challenges employers to initiate
creative programs designed to discover and utilize the job potential of minority
applicants."); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and
Subjective Judgments, 63 Ci.-KENT L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1987).
14. Bernhardt, supra note 13, at 928.
15. Blumrosen, supra note 13, at 1.
16. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DIsSCRMINATION LAws 234-36 (1992); Paul Brest, In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976) (describing disparate
impact as one of the "most controversial and important" civil rights issues of the
preceding decade).
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inevitably toward a narrowing of the Court's options in
fashioning a remedy. If the problem is to be demonstrated by
the mere fact of a discrepancy, then the solution logically must
amount to an order to bring the employment statistics into line
with the population statistics . . . .s
This fear, that employers would simply engage in quota hiring to
avoid disparate impact liability, was a constant threat to disparate
impact law's development.
Five years after deciding Griggs, the Court concluded that the
disparate impact theory was not available to plaintiffs bringing
constitutional claims; instead, the Equal Protection Clause is
violated only by intentionally discriminatory conduct. 8 Indeed, the
Washington v. Davis majority revealed considerable skepticism
about disparate impact as a theory of discrimination, announcing
that, "[als an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a
law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is
nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any
person ... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater
proportion of Negroes fails to qualify than members of other racial
or ethnic groups."'9 This rejection of disparate impact theory in
constitutional analysis put disparate impact claims on shaky ground
by creating a distinction between "true" discrimination and claims of
disparate impact.20
The question of whether disparate impact effectively required
employers to implement quotas to avoid liability was presented to
the Supreme Court as early as 1977.21 The concern expressed by
critics of impact theory was that, if plaintiffs can make out a prima
facie case of disparate impact discrimination merely by showing that
an employer's hiring or promotion policies lead to statistical
underrepresentation of a protected class, then defendants will have
an incentive to avoid liability by simply ensuring that their
workforce does not show that statistical underrepresentation." This
is troubling, critics argue, because Title VII specifically provides
that the statute shall not be interpreted to require any kind of
proportional representation.2 3
17. Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 n.5
(D. Md. 1973).
18. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
19. Id. at 245 (alteration in original).
20. Indeed, the question of whether disparate impact theory actually
violates the Constitution is now up for debate. See Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658, 2681-82 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). The seeds of that debate were
certainly sowed in Washington v. Davis.
21. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
22. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 234-36; Hugh Steven Wilson, A
Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing,
Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 873
(1972).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter
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In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the
Supreme Court dismissed the concern that reliance on statistical
proof will lead to race-based quota hiring.24 In a disparate treatment
case, statistics are probative because they are "often a telltale sign
of purposeful discrimination."25  In disparate impact litigation,
statistical disparities push the employer to justify its business
practices-to explain why the practice that is creating the disparity
is actually necessary for the workplace. Liability will not flow from
statistical disparities alone, but from reliance on business practices
that are unnecessary and that im ose a disproportionate
disadvantage on women or people of color.
The tension between those who viewed disparate impact as the
best hope for challenging continued workplace inequality and those
who viewed impact theory as an illegal directive to implement hiring
quotas came to a head in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. In
Wards Cove, the Supreme Court confronted a disparate impact
challenge to the racially segregated world of salmon canneries in
Alaska. 27  At the two canneries that were the subject of the
litigation, jobs were classified as "cannery" (unskilled) and
"noncannery" (skilled).2 8  The cannery jobs were filled almost
entirely by Filipinos and Alaska Natives who were either hired
through one union or resided in villages near the canneries.29 The
noncannery jobs, which paid more than the cannery positions, were
filled predominantly by whites who were recruited in Washington
and Oregon.o Cannery employees lived in separate dormitories and
shall be interpreted to require any employer . .. to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race . .. or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race . . .or national
origin employed by any employer. . . in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of such race ... or national origin in any community,
State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
State, section, or other area.").
24. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20 ("Statistics showing racial or ethnic
imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance
is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination."); see also Shoben, supra
note 12, at 42 (discussing Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Teamsters and
suggesting that the function of disparate impact analysis is not to require an
employer to maintain quotas).
25. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
26. See id. at 339-40 (stating that testimony about personal experiences
with the company "brought the cold numbers convincingly to life," and that the
usefulness of statistics "depends on all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances").
27. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
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ate in separate dining halls from the noncannery employees.
Justice Blackmun described these working conditions in his
dissenting opinion:
The salmon industry as described by this record takes us back
to a kind of overt and institutionalized discrimination we have
not dealt with in years: a total residential and work
environment organized on principles of racial stratification
and segregation .... This industry long has been
characterized by a taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned
sort: a preference for hiring nonwhites to fill its lowest level
positions, on the condition that they stay there.3 2
In 1974, fifteen years before the case would reach the Supreme
Court, a class of nonwhite cannery workers brought suit challenging
a broad range of the companies' employment policies: nepotism,
separate hiring channels for cannery and noncannery positions, a
rehire preference, a practice of not promoting from within, an
English language requirement, no posting for noncannery positions,
and a lack of objective hiring criteria. 3 The plaintiffs contended
that these practices "were responsible for the racial stratification of
the work force and had denied them and other nonwhites
employment as noncannery workers on the basis of race."3 ' They
claimed both disparate impact and disparate treatment violations of
Title VII." The Wards Cove litigation had a tortuous procedural
history during which the lower courts rejected the plaintiffs'
disparate treatment claims but permitted the impact claims." The
dispute arrived at the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal,
and the Court took the case as an opportunity to make a number of
pronouncements about Title VII's disparate impact standards.
In a sharply divided opinion, the Court first criticized the lower
court's comparison of the percentage of cannery positions held by
nonwhites with the percentage of noncannery positions held by
31. Id.
32. Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 647-48 (majority opinion).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 648.
36. Id. The disparate impact claims got significantly more attention from
both the litigants and the courts throughout the litigation, presumably because
they were somewhat novel. Prior to 1989, only objective employer tests were
subject to disparate impact analysis. Id. The kinds of hiring standards
challenged here were not considered employer "practices." That approach
changed during the course of this litigation, and it was the primary focus of the
litigation. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-90
(1988) (disparate impact analysis can apply to subjective employment
practices). Given the strength of some of the disparate treatment evidence, one
wonders what might have happened if the plaintiffs had maintained a more
aggressive focus on their claims of intentional discrimination.
37. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649-50.
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nonwhites. 8 The relevant comparison, the majority explained, is
between the percentage of job holders and the percentage of
qualified applicants for those jobs." In telling its story about what
qualifications were relevant to that comparison, the Wards Cove
majority focused exclusively on the noncannery jobs that required
special skills, such as accountants, doctors, and other professionals.40
To compare those jobs to the unskilled positions held by cannery
workers was to hold the employer responsible for differences
between the two labor pools that had nothing to do with the
employers' policies and practices: "If the absence of minorities
holding such skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified
nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not the petitioners' fault),
petitioners' selection methods or employment practices cannot be
said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites."
The Court went on to hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate
impact challenge must identify with specificity what particular
employment practice caused the complained-of disparate impact.4 2
Plaintiffs cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact
simply by pointing to significant racial disparities in workforce
composition.4 ' The Court concluded that "[tlo hold otherwise would
result in employers being potentially liable for 'the myriad of
innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the
composition of their work forces.'""
Finally, and most controversially, the Court reversed twenty
years of disparate impact law and concluded that an employer
seeking to explain racial disparity with a "business necessity" will
not have to demonstrate that the practice in question is "essential"
or "indispensible."" Forcing the employer to meet this burden, the
majority explained, imposes too onerous a standard, and "would
result in a host of evils."" This "host of evils" is the possibility that
employers will engage in quotas or hiring goals in order to avoid
disparate impact liability. Instead, the Court held that an
employer facing a charge of disparate impact discrimination would
not have to "demonstrate" anything, in the sense of meeting a
burden of proof." Instead of being an affirmative defense-which
38. Id. at 650.
39. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977)).
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id. at 651-52 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 657.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992
(1988)).
45. Id. at 659.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 652-53.
48. Id. at 657, 659.
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"business necessity" had been since Griggs-the majority concluded
that the employer's burden should be merely a burden of
production. 9 The disparate impact plaintiff would be required to
demonstrate that the challenged practice was not a business
necessity.so Moreover, the Wards Cove majority significantly
weakened the "business necessity" threshold, concluding that an
employer's challenged policy need only serve "the legitimate
employment goals of the employer.""
Wards Cove produced two impassioned dissents, one penned by
Justice Blackmun52 and the other by Justice Stevens.53 Blackmun's
dissent observed that the legal changes wrought by the decision
"essentially immunize [d] . . . from attack" the range of practices that
entrenched "racial stratification and segregation" in the salmon
industry. 54  Justice Stevens's dissent accused the majority of
"[tiurning a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII,"
when it "perfunctorily reject[ed] a longstanding rule of law and
underestimate [d] the probative value of evidence of a racially
stratified work force."" One of the most striking things about the
three opinions-the majority and the two dissents-is what
radically different meaning the dissenting Justices took from the
facts of the case than did the members of the five-Justice majority.
As Justice Blackmun concluded, "One wonders whether the majority
still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race
discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or
even remembers that it ever was."56
Justice Stevens's dissent began by observing that this case had
very unusual and complicated facts and should not have been used
to rewrite the law. He went on to detail the ways in which the
Wards Cove majority broke from the settled law in disparate impact
cases. A substantial part of the dissent was occupied with
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. The Court concluded by noting that, even if the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that a challenged practice had no business purpose, they might
identify an alternative that would have less impact, but still achieve the
employer's legitimate goal. Id. at 660-61. Here, in a final blow to the viability
of disparate impact claims, the Court found that "any alternative practices
which respondents offer up in this respect must be equally effective as
petitioners' chosen hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate
employment goals" and that the cost of implementing any change was a
relevant consideration to whether an alternative was reasonable. Id. at 661.
52. Id. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 663 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 671-73 (stating that the majority reduced the weight of the
employer's burden of proof, discarded the requirement that the employment
practice be essential, and increased the employee's burden of proof of the causal
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challenging the majority's view of how to think about the statistical
evidence offered to the lower courts.59  Where the majority
disregarded the segregation of the noncannery and cannery
workforces as being irrelevant comparisons, Justice Stevens argued
that in the "unique industry" of Alaskan salmon canneries, there are
key elements that make the comparison of these two groups
particularly appropriate. 60 He presented a very different picture of
the "skilled" noncannery positions filled almost entirely by white
employees; instead of focusing on the doctors and accountants that
occupy the majority, he pointed out that the "skills" required for
many of those positions included only things like English literacy,
typing, good health, and possession of a driver's license.6 Moreover,
Justice Stevens pointed out that one of the most important job
qualifications for both cannery and noncannery employees in this
industry was a willingness to be available for and to accept seasonal
employment. That important variable makes the comparison
between these two groups of employees arguably more relevant than
any other comparison and certainly as relevant as a comparison of
noncannery workers with the general labor force.
The fundamental difference between the stories told by the
dissents and the story told by the majority is a crucial element of
Wards Cove. The majority saw the facts through a lens of
skepticism about-even perhaps hostility to-the reach of disparate
impact theory. The absolute segregation of the salmon industry did
not worry the Justices in the majority because they viewed that
segregation as occurring naturally, unrelated to policy choices being
made by the employer. For the dissenting Justices, the "unsettling
resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy"63 was the major
concern, and the lens through which the applicable legal standards
were considered. Wards Cove revealed how completely divergent
views about disparate impact law mirrored similar debates about
affirmative action. In both contexts, one sees the substantial divide
between those who view workplace discrimination against people of
color as a continuing serious problem and those who believe that
antidiscrimination laws have themselves become a source of unfair
treatment of white workers."
link to a specific practice).
59. See id. at 673-78 (stating that the concept of relevant labor market is
not susceptible to exact definition and should here include willingness to accept
employment in the industry, and that evidence concerning plaintiffs' job
qualifications and wage differentials in the industry is persuasive despite the
lack of precise numerical findings on those issues).
60. Id. at 674-75.
61. Id. at 674.
62. Id. at 676.
63. Id. at 664 n.4.
64. It is not surprising that the Supreme Court decided Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
2011] 269
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II. THE REBIRTH OF DISPARATE IMPACT
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was an emphatic and hard-fought
rejection of several 1989 Supreme Court decisions-most especially
of Wards Cove's changes to disparate impact law.6 The bill that
passed and that was signed by President George H. W. Bush was
heralded as a victory for plaintiffs in part because of the process
that led to its passage. The bill was first vetoed, and the subsequent
year-long negotiations ended with what many called a "capitulation"
by a Republican White House to the demands of civil rights leaders
that disparate impact law remain a viable litigation theory.6 The
core of the debate that shaped the relevant provisions of the
legislation was about the relationship between disparate impact and
quotas.
The 1991 codification of disparate impact explicitly returned the
law, in certain respects, to its pre-Wards Cove status. In
particular, section 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended
by section 105(a) of the 1991 Act, now specifies that "business
necessity" is an affirmative defense, which the defendant carries the
burden of demonstrating after the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case that an employer practice disproportionately impacts
protected employees.68 "Business necessity," which the Wards Cove
majority had described as anything consistent with "legitimate
employment goals,"69 is defined in the new section 703(k) as "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
102-166, § 8, 105 Stat. 1074, 1076-77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006)),
the same year it decided Wards Cove. In Wilks, the Court considered how to
balance the rights of African-American employees, who entered a consent
decree with the Birmingham Fire Department to correct a long history of
discrimination, against the rights of white employees, who argued that they
were losing job opportunities because of the decree. Id. at 758. Wilks was also
legislatively overruled in the 1991 Act. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (stating that section 108 of the 1991 Act responds to Wilks
"by prohibiting certain challenges to employment practices implementing
consent decrees").
65. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 984 (1993).
66. Id. at 983; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past
the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 953-54 (2005)
(suggesting that the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill controversy spurred President
Bush to compromise).
67. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006))
(stating that a purpose of the 1991 Act was "to codify the concepts of 'business
necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio." (citations omitted)).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i)).
69. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
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necessity. The 1991 Act also specifically returned the meaning of
"alternative employment practice" to that which it had been under
"the law as it existed on June 4, 1989."" As to the prima facie case,
which the Supreme Court had said required identification of a
specific employment practice,72 Congress provided that a plaintiff
typically does have to demonstrate a particular practice that causes
a disparate impact, but the legislature offered an exception for
circumstances in which the plaintiff can demonstrate "that the
elements of a [defendant's] decisionmaking process are not capable
of separation for analysis."73  In that circumstance, "the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
practice."
Given the battle over disparate impact that led to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, it would be reasonable to imagine an increase in the
number of disparate impact cases following the statute's enactment.
In fact, however, there was no surge in the number of disparate
impact suits filed after 1991. And, as Michael Selmi's 2006
empirical evaluation of disparate impact cases demonstrated,
plaintiffs had significantly more success with disparate impact
claims before 1991 than after.
There are a number of possible explanations for the relatively
small number of disparate impact claims in the federal courts.
Perhaps most significantly, the 1991 Act added compensatory and
punitive damages to Title VII's remedial arsenal, but only for claims
of intentional discrimination. This change created substantial
incentives for plaintiffs to frame their suits as disparate treatment
rather than disparate impact claims. Further, although the 1991
Act was quite explicit in rejecting Wards Cove, the statute still left
considerable uncertainty about core interpretive questions-
including what constitutes an "employment practice" subject to
challenge and precisely what "business necessity" means-in
disparate impact litigation. And importantly, the number of
disparate impact claims was lower by the 1990s because disparate
impact theory was doing what it was in large part intended to do:
encourage employers to develop internal practices that did not have
a disparate impact on protected classes. Indeed "[tihe disparate
impact standard ... triggered reconsideration of a wide range of
promotion practices and other devices that failed to accurately
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C). What exactly this means is not entirely
clear, as the meaning of "alternative employment practice" has never been
completely clear. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 66, at 963-64.
72. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
74. Id.
75. Selmi, supra note 6, at 738-40; cf. Sullivan, supra note 66, at 954
(noting the paucity of disparate impact cases since 1991).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1) (2006).
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measure and predict candidates' job performance. " By 1991,
twenty years after Griggs, employer practices that caused obvious
disparate impact without any business justification had been
eliminated in many workplaces through employers' own internal
compliance efforts.
Just as the promise of the 1991 Act might have been more
rhetorical than substantive for potential disparate impact litigation,
the perils that opponents saw lurking behind disparate impact
theory did not emerge in the wake of the new law. There is
absolutely no evidence to suggest that the newly codified disparate
impact theory led employers to adopt quotas or to lower their
employment standards. But the fear that potential disparate impact
liability might lead employers to adopt hiring quotas-and more
generally the anxiety that antidiscrimination laws were themselves
prompting discrimination against white employees-has not
diminished.
III. RICCI: IS DISPARATE IMPACT DEAD AGAIN?
Twenty years and twenty days after announcing its ruling in
Wards Cove, the Supreme Court issued another sharply divided set
of opinions in Ricci v. DeStefano." Ricci was a disparate treatment
case, but the allegation of disparate treatment stemmed from the
City of New Haven's effort to avoid disparate impact liability." A
five-Justice majority concluded that the City had engaged in
intentional discrimination against white firefighters when it
declined to certify the results of a promotion test that had a
disparate impact on minority firefighters.o
Ricci shared a number of similarities with the Wards Cove
decision. One of the most immediately notable is that in both cases
the Court's majority ignored basic procedural norms that are
supposed to constrain the Supreme Court in order to reach its
preferred outcome. In Wards Cove, the Court significantly altered
disparate impact law in a case that came to it on interlocutory
review, and the dissent was sharply critical of what it saw as
procedural impropriety.8' Similarly in Ricci, the dissenting Justices
observed that the majority was departing from the Court's usual
procedural rules by not simply reversing the summary judgment
granted and upheld below, but actually reviewing the record and
granting summary judgment for the other side.82 The willingness to
77. Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-
Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 253-54 (2010).
78. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
79. Id. at 2671.
80. Id. at 2681.
81. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Especially
surprising here was that the majority granted summary judgment for the
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ignore procedural norms gives both opinions an aura of "judicial
activism" that heightens the sense that both are part of a political
debate in which statutory interpretation is just one argument.
Wards Cove and Ricci are also notable for their complex facts,
and for the widely different view of the facts offered by the majority
and the dissent in each case. The highly contested facts in Ricci
made especially surprising the majority's decision to grant summary
judgment based on the record as it stood at the Supreme Court.'
In 2003, the City of New Haven administered a written test as
part of the process for selecting promotion-eligible employees for
officer positions in the fire department." The test was developed to
account for sixty percent of the promotion process because the City's
decades-old contract with the firefighter's union provided that
promotion would be based sixty percent on a written exam and forty
percent on an oral exam." The City charter provided that, after the
exam was administered, the Civil Service Board would rank
applicants, creating a list from which vacancies would be filled.8 6
Candidates had to be chosen from among the top three scorers on
the list, and the list would remain valid for two years." Seventy-
seven candidates completed the 2003 lieutenant examination and
forty-one candidates completed the examination for promotion to
captain.8" The results on both examinations showed significant
racial disparities for both African-American and Latino test takers
sufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under
Title VII. 9
As soon as the exam results were made publicly available,
"slome firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the
results showed the test to be discriminatory. They threatened a
discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the
tests. Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And
they, in turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit" if the City did
not certify the results. 0 At this point, the City found itself between
the proverbial rock and a hard place.
In January 2004, the Civil Service Board met to decide whether
to certify the results of the exam.9 1 At the beginning of the meeting,
the City's director of Human Resources informed the board that she
believed the exam created a "significant disparate impact" on test
plaintiffs-a procedural anomaly at any level of the federal court system.
83. Id. at 2681 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 2666.
85. Id. at 2665.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2666.
89. Id. at 2677-78.
90. Id. at 2664.
91. Id. at 2667.
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takers." Over the course of five meetings, the Civil Service Board
heard testimony from the person who had developed the test for the
City, additional firefighters, New Haven community members, other
professional test developers, individuals employed in fire
departments in other cities, the City's legal counsel, and a
psychologist from Boston College, among others.93 At the close of
these meetings, the Civil Service Board voted on whether to certify
the results. With one member recused, the remaining four board
members were deadlocked, two to two, on whether to certify;
consequently, the list was not certified.94
Following the decision not to certify the results, seventeen white
firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter filed suit, alleging, among
other claims, that the decision not to certify was an act of
intentional race discrimination.95  In district court, the City
successfully argued that the Civil Service Board's good-faith belief
that certifying the exam would expose it to liability for disparate
impact discrimination shielded it from liability for disparate
treatment, and was granted summary judgment. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, concluding that "there is no genuine
dispute that the examinations were job-related and consistent with
business necessity,"97 and granted summary judgment for the
firefighters.98  For the majority, the story-the undisputed and
indisputable story-of what happened in New Haven was this:
The record in this litigation documents a process that, at the
outset, had the potential to produce a testing procedure that
was true to the promise of Title VII: No individual should face
workplace discrimination based on race. Respondents thought
about promotion qualifications and relevant experience in
neutral ways. They were careful to ensure broad racial
participation in the design of the test itself and its
administration. As we have discussed at length, the process
was open and fair. The problem, of course, is that after the
tests were completed, the raw racial results became the
predominant rationale for the City's refusal to certify the
results.9
This understanding of what happened in New Haven rests on a
number of much contested assumptions about the neutrality and
fairness of the City's test and the process used to design it. The
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2667-71.
94. Id. at 2671.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed this grant of summary judgment.
Id. at 2672.
97. Id. at 2678.
98. Id. at 2681.
99. Id.
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majority simply disregarded the catalog of contested factual
questions. With these blinders on, it could perceive the statistically
significant disparate impact of the test as legally irrelevant.
The Ricci dissent told a very different story. The dissent
described a long history of race discrimination in the New Haven
Fire Department and pointed to portions of the record that
suggested that the challenged test was significantly more
problematic than the majority's recitation of the facts suggested.o
While the majority lauded the test-development process, the dissent
pointed out that there was no determination before hiring the test
writer of what kind of test would best evaluate candidates for
promotion.10 In fact, the City didn't consider any other testing
mechanism; didn't question its use of a decades-old decision to
weight the written exam sixty percent and the oral exam forty
percent; and didn't vet the written exam with any experienced local
firefighters. 02
Indeed, only after the test was administered, and the significant
adverse impact became apparent, did the City seem to realize the
range of flaws in the test and refer the question to the Civil Service
Board. 03  At this point, too, the dissenting opinion demonstrates
that a very different story can be read in the record than the
majority's view that only statistical racial disparities mattered in
the Civil Service Board's process; the record included evidence that
Civil Service Board members understood that "their principal task
was to decide whether they were confident about the reliability of
the exams: Had the exams fairly measured the qualities of a
successful fire officer despite their disparate results? Might an
alternative examination process have identified the most qualified
candidates without creating such significant racial imbalances?"o"
The dramatically different readings of what actually happened
in New Haven presented in the Ricci opinions are a result of the
widely divergent views held by the majority and the dissenting
Justices about the problem of discrimination.o'0  Why did the
original test end up with such disparate results? The Supreme
Court's majority believed that it was because white people do better
on objective tests that evaluate merit. 106 The Ricci majority's
description of the facts was replete with quotes accounting for this
discrepancy: "usually whites outperform some of the minorities on
100. Id. at 2690-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2691.
102. Norton, supra note 77, at 221.
103. Id. at 2692.
104. Id.
105. See Norton, supra note 77, at 215-19.
106. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court
Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584 (2010)
("Indeed, the Court seemed to suggest that the test actually tested merit.").
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testing";'07 "[n]ormally, whites outperform ethnic minorities on the
majority of standardized testing procedures";o and "regardless of
what kind of written test we give in this country .. . we can just
about predict how many people will pass who are members of under-
represented groups. And your data are not that inconsistent with
what predictions would say were the case."'" Of course, this was all
testimony that was in fact presented to the Civil Service Board. But
it is just a very small sample of the testimony offered during the
course of the five meetings the Civil Service Board held about these
tests. There was also a great deal of evidence-the evidence
credited by the dissenting Justices-that showed New Haven's test
was not developed with care and other tests would more accurately
measure qualifications and would do so with much less racial
disparity."o
The conviction that whites just do better is central to the
majority's conclusion that the decision not to certify the test results
constituted "race-based" discrimination. As Girardeau Spann has
observed,
The reason that the Ricci Court displayed such unquestioning
deference to the standardized promotion exam is precisely
because whites outperform minorities on standardized tests. I
am not suggesting that the Court conspiratorially chose to
utilize an invalid selection criterion in order to favor white
firefighters over minority firefighters. I am suggesting
something much more troubling. I am suggesting that-
despite a mass of contrary evidence-the Court actually
believed the standardized test to be valid because the results of
that test corresponded to the racially-correlated expectations
that the culture had taught the Justices equate with merit.
Because whites outperformed minorities on the exam, the
exam must have been measuring qualities that were relevant
to merit-based promotions. Therefore, any decision not to
certify the results of that exam must have been rooted in a
desire to abandon merit in favor of unwarranted racial
affirmative action."'
This is the point at which Ricci becomes a case about disparate
impact's increasingly uncertain future. While the majority
specifically declined the opportunity to hold that Title VII's
disparate impact provisions are unconstitutional, it began its
analysis "with this premise: The City's actions would violate the
107. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2669 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108. Id. at 2668 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 2669 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 2704-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. See Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1154
(2010).
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disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid
defense."112 This statement could be read-and is being treated by
many employment lawyers-as suggesting that efforts to avoid
disparate impact on minority employees will always present white
employees with a cause of action for discriminatory disparate
treatment and that employers will only be able to avoid liability in
those cases in which they can satisfy Ricci's new "strong basis in
evidence" defense."3
Ricci did not, in fact, eliminate r even really change-
disparate impact law. Employers are still required under Title VII,
if their employment practices have an adverse impact, to ensure
that the practices are job related and consistent with business
necessity. The majority was quite explicit in stating that an
employer may still design job tests and other practices with the goal
of avoiding a disparate impact." Importantly, the majority drew a
line between voluntary compliance efforts that seek to avoid
disparate impact in the creation and administration of employment
tests and practices, on the one hand, and the evaluation of test
scores after the tests have been taken, on the other. The former are
not subject to the Court's new approach. Only after a test has been
taken-when the actual racial makeup of the results is known-will
an employer be at risk of disparate treatment liability. At that
point, of course, the risk may be significant. The "strong basis in
evidence" defense, which the majority imported from case law on
affirmative action,"' may be a hard one to meet. The Court provided
no guidance about what kind of information would be sufficient for
an employer to demonstrate, after it had administered a test and
seen the results, that it had a strong basis in evidence for believing
that it would be violating disparate impact law to use the test in
making employment decisions.
What Ricci does do is make voluntary diversity efforts less
appealing to employers by casting a shadow of potential litigation
over these efforts. Will an employer going through a reduction in
force, for example, be sued by white employees if it seeks to ensure
112. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (majority opinion). Indeed, Justice Scalia
concurs separately to note that the decision does not conclude that Title VII's
disparate impact provision is unconstitutional. Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). That question, in his view, is one the Court will likely address in
the future. Id.
113. Justice Ginsburg seems to have understood this to be the majority's
new rule. See id. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Employers may attempt to
comply with Title VII's disparate-impact provision, the Court declares, only
where there is a 'strong basis in evidence' documenting the necessity of their
action."). This "strong basis in evidence" defense, which had never been applied
in a Title VII case, was imported from a branch of the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. Id. at 2662 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 2677.
115. Id. at 2675-76 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 500 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
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that the reduction in force will not unduly impact minority
employees? Will employers face claims of race discrimination if they
participate in minority job fairs or engage in other diversity efforts?
Ricci can certainly be read to suggest that any employer action
taken to increase opportunities for formerly excluded minority
employees constitutes intentional discrimination against white
employees. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissenting opinion,
there is a "sharp conflict" between the Ricci decision and the
"voluntary compliance ideal" that has long been central to the
Court's interpretation of Title VII.116
Given the important role that voluntary compliance has always
played in response to the possibility of disparate impact liability,
Ricci's consequences for the viability of the doctrine as an important
tool in antidiscrimination law are as significant as were the
doctrinal changes of Wards Cove. Indeed, Ricci may be even more
troubling because it is extremely hard to know how to respond to the
opinion, not only for employers, as discussed above, but also for
those seeking a legislative fix for the Court's new legal standard.
After Wards Cove, the calls for a legislative response were
immediate'17 and it was relatively clear what a responsive statute
might look like: the Court's opinion had included a series of specific
doctrinal statements, and the 1991 Act contained provisions that
tracked those statements."8 In doing so, Congress made a powerful
rhetorical statement rejecting the Supreme Court's view of the law.
Although there have been calls for a legislative response to
Ricci,H9 it really is not clear what that response could look like.
Congress could pass a statute providing that the "strong basis in
evidence" test is too high a standard for employers to meet when
facing a disparate treatment challenge to efforts at compliance with
disparate impact obligations. The legislature could instead adopt
the standard proposed by Justice Ginsburg's dissent. But either
legislative fix would hardly be responsive to the rhetoric of Ricci.
Still standing would be the underlying assumption: when employers
seek to avoid tests that unfairly impact minority workers they are
engaging in discrimination against white workers. That is the true
116. Id. at 2701-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. See Niall A. Paul, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: The Supreme
Court's Disparate Treatment of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 8 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 127, 153 & nn.236-37 (1990) (recounting congressional reaction to Wards
Cove and detailing the resulting legislation that was introduced); see also
Candace S. Kovacic-Fleisher, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse
and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 666 (1990)
(recommending legislation to restore basic burden of proof principles in
disparate impact cases).
118. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071,
1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)).
119. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:
Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 163-65
(2010).
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harm in Ricci.
CONCLUSION
Many people have pointed out that Ricci, read neutrally,
suggests that mere racial consciousness is enough to demonstrate
intent to discriminate.120  This would be a radical change in
employment discrimination law if applied to all cases under Title
VII."'2 And yet, nobody really believes the import of Ricci was a
liberalizing of the standards that all plaintiffs must meet to prove
discrimination. Twenty years before Ricci, Justice Blackmun's
Wards Cove dissent expressed the fear that "[o]ne wonders whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination-or, more
accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in
our society, or even remembers that it ever was."22 The same could
be said of the Ricci majority, which seems to have created and
applied a standard for proving discrimination that is applicable only
when the plaintiff is attacking an employer's voluntary effort to
avoid disparate impact. The opinion reflects the sad reality that a
majority of the Justices today are likely among the fifty-six percent
of American Republicans who believe discrimination against whites
is the most serious discrimination problem that our country faces.123
On the twentieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 this is
a solemn statement about the true impediments to equality.
120. Chambers, supra note 106, at 587.
121. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 207.
122. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44
(2003).
123. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Let's Rescue the Race Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2010, at A19.
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